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Introduction 
It is now widely recognised that a profound cultural, social and spiritual relationship with 
their lands and territories is characteristic of indigenous peoples and fundamental to their 
survival. In spite of this fact, indigenous peoples have been and are repeatedly deprived of 
their lands, territories and resources.1 Present day economic imperatives arising from 
globalisation are putting new strains on indigenous peoples’ rights over their traditional 
territories.2 Driven by the demands of an increasingly globalised economy and the opening 
up of markets in developing countries to foreign direct investment, activities such as mining, 
logging, dam construction and mono-cropping are becoming synonymous with violations of 
indigenous peoples’ rights, resulting in ongoing tensions and conflicts between indigenous 
peoples, states and transnational corporations. Central to the realization of indigenous 
peoples’ land and self-determination rights is their ability to ensure recognition and 
enforcement of these rights.  
                                                          
1 See Indigenous Peoples and their Relationship to Land, Final Working Paper Prepared by the Special 
Rapporteur, E-I Daes, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21. 
2 For references, see M Stewart-Harawira, The New Imperial Order: Indigenous Responses to 
Globalization (London, Zed Books, 2005).  
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In recent decades, owing to the difficulties encountered in relation to access to justice at the 
local level pertaining to the enforcement of their rights, many indigenous peoples have 
turned to international legal institutions.3 This has resulted in the emergence of an 
important body of international human rights law relating to indigenous peoples’ land 
rights.4 However, this regime is still in its infancy and remains somewhat fragmented. 
Cognisant of this, indigenous peoples and the organisations that were involved in the 
negotiations for the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(‘the Declaration’) placed great emphasis on the need for strongly worded and unambiguous 
language pertaining to their land, territory and resources and associated self-determination  
rights in this Declaration. Accordingly, it was expected that a universal declaration on the 
rights of indigenous peoples would reflect the importance of these rights for indigenous 
peoples.  
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the potential significance of the adoption of the 
Declaration in the development of international legal standards regarding indigenous 
peoples’ land, territory and resource rights. Despite the expanding jurisprudence generated 
by the UN treaty monitoring bodies on indigenous peoples’ rights,5 questions remain as to 
the capacity of general international human rights law to successfully accommodate 
                                                          
3 The UN declared 1994–2004 the First World Decade on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and 2005–
15 the second decade; see GA Res A/RES/48/163 (1994) and Res A/RES/59/174 (2005). See also SJ 
Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2004). 
4 J Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors (New 
York, Transnational, 2006). 
5 See generally P Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights (Manchester University Press, 
2002).  
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indigenous peoples’ specific territorial claims at the local level. Given this context, this 
chapter aims to examine to what extent the Declaration can serve as a positive force to 
protect indigenous peoples’ land, territory and resource rights by providing the basis for the 
development of a strong corpus of specific territorial and associated self-governance rights 
for indigenous peoples. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section analyses 
the extent to which the Declaration plays an important role in affirming and recognising 
indigenous peoples’ specific relationship with their lands and territories. The authors go on 
to examine how, in a context where many states have traditionally been reluctant to 
recognise collective rights, the Declaration articulates a collective right to lands, territories 
and resources.6 The following section addresses the requirement that, in accordance with 
their right to self-determination, indigenous peoples’ free, prior and informed consent is 
obtained in the context of developments that impact on their lands and territories, in 
particular in relation to resource exploitation. It examines the Declaration’s potential to 
contribute to the realisation of this self-determination requirement in practice and to act as 
a platform for the affirmation of a right to free, prior and informed consent within the 
normative framework of indigenous peoples’ rights. Drawing from their analysis, the authors 
conclude the chapter by arguing that the true significance of the Declaration can only be 
fully appreciated when viewed in its historical context as having emerged from the 
systematic denial of indigenous peoples’ rights; its contemporary context as an integral 
component of the evolving normative framework pertaining to the rights of indigenous 
peoples; and its future context as a platform for the elaboration and realisation of these 
rights.  
                                                          
6 D Sanders, ‘Collective Rights’ (1991) 13 Human Rights Quarterly 368; C Holder and J Corntassel, 
‘Indigenous Peoples and Multicultural Citizenship: Bridging Collective and Individual Rights’ (2002) 24 
Human Rights Quarterly 126. 
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Land Rights and Cultural Identity 
The United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (PFII) recently observed that 
‘Land is the foundation of the lives and cultures of indigenous peoples all over the 
world.Without access to and respect for their rights over their lands, territories and natural 
resources, the survival of indigenous peoples’ particular distinct culture is threatened.’7 For 
indigenous peoples, land is not only a source of economic livelihood but also the source of 
spiritual, cultural and social identity. From this perspective indigenous peoples’ claims to 
land rights involve not only traditional property rights and claim to title to territory but also 
cultural, social and spiritual claims. It is this specificity that indigenous peoples wanted the 
Declaration to reflect. The recognition of indigenous peoples’ specific claims to land in the 
Declaration was seen as an important step for international law as, historically, international 
law had been a major factor in the alienation of indigenous peoples’ land rights.  
The Origins: International Law and Dispossession 
International institutions working with indigenous peoples have begun to acknowledge this 
specific connection between cultural identity and land rights for indigenous peoples, but this 
practice is recent. Traditionally, international law and legal institutions at the national level 
have played a significant role in the destruction of indigenous peoples’ cultures by 
supporting acts of dispossession and legalising the colonisation of indigenous peoples’ 
territories.8 Justifications of such colonisation were invariably based on racist approaches 
                                                          
7 Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Report on the Sixth Session (14–15 May 2007), Economic 
and Social Council Official Records Supplement No 23, UN Doc E/2007/43, E/C.19/2007/12, para 4. 
8 See generally L Robertson, Conquest by Law (Oxford University Press, 2005); RA Williams, Jr, The 
American Indian in Western Legal Thought (Oxford University Press, 1990). 
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towards indigenous cultures. Notions such as terra nullius and discovery assumed that 
indigenous peoples were so uncivilised that they could be considered not to exist and that 
consequently their lands were open to conquest.9 Ironically, the universalisation of 
international law was principally a consequence of the imperial expansion that took place in 
the past centuries, as one of the first doctrines of international law was the recognition of a 
right of conquest for the imperial powers.10 Through such theory international law has 
affirmed the superiority of imperial colonial powers over indigenous communities. A clear 
distinction between the ‘civilised’ and the ‘non-civilised’ served to assert that international 
law applied only to the sovereign states that composed the so-called ‘civilised family of 
nations’.11 With the assumption of the superiority of ‘civilised’ states and the denial of the 
legal existence of so-called ‘non-civilised communities’, indigenous communities were 
refused ownership of their lands.  
 
Probably the best summary of international law’s approach to land rights during the colonial 
era comes from Lindley’s famous book The Acquisition of Backward Territory, in which he 
                                                          
9 See especially M Bedjaoui, Terra nullius, ‘droits’ historiques et autodétermination (La Haye, Exposés 
oraux prononcés devant la Cour Internationale de Justice en l’affaire du Sahara Occidental, 1975). 
10 See generally P Keal, European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). 
11 See generally M Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (Cambridge University Press, 2001); A 
Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2004). 
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describes how law was used as a justification for the dispossession of indigenous peoples.12 
Chronologically, international law legitimised the acquisition of indigenous territories in two 
different ways. The first epoch saw the recognition of indigenous territorial existence, with 
international law developing around the notion of the right to acquire these territories by 
conquest. The second epoch was based on a different approach whereby indigenous peoples 
were regarded as legally non-existent. Thus, indigenous communities and nations could not 
hold territorial rights and this legacy of non-existence facilitated the subsequent colonisation 
of all indigenous land. Without going into detail on the role of international law in such 
instances of dispossession, it is important to bear in mind that it was only in 1992 that the 
Australian High Court recognised that terra nullius was a ‘racist fiction’,13 and it was only 
during the twentieth century that it became ‘possible to argue that the right of conquest has 
ceased to be upheld by international law’.14 Overall, international law has clearly been a 
crucial tool that justified the dispossession of indigenous peoples of their territories; hence, 
viewed from a historical perspective, international law was not considered a logical ally and 
friend to support indigenous peoples’ land rights; rather it was seen as a foe. It was with this 
historical background in mind that in 1985 the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations 
(WGIP) started work on the elaboration of an international declaration on the rights of 
                                                          
12 MF Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law (Longmans, 
Green and Co, 1926, reprinted New York, Negro Universities Press, 1969) 11. 
13 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 107 ALR 1. 
14 S Korman, The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law and 
Practice (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996) 8. 
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indigenous peoples.15 It is consequently not surprising that one of the first affirmations in 
the preamble to the Declaration is the acknowledgement that ‘indigenous peoples have 
suffered from historic injustices as a result of, inter alia, their colonization and dispossession 
of their lands, territories and resources …’.  
The Holistic Approach to Land Rights 
As highlighted above, historically international law failed to recognise indigenous peoples’ 
specific attachment to land. Hence recent recognition of indigenous peoples’ specific 
attachment to their territories is seen as an important step under international law. In their 
claims under international law, indigenous peoples have insisted on the need to 
acknowledge their specific approach to land rights. This is reflected in the International 
Labour Organization’s (ILO) Convention 169 which affirms that, in applying the Convention, 
‘governments shall respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the 
peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands or territories, or both as applicable, 
which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of this 
relationship’.16 Likewise, the World Bank operational policies on indigenous peoples also 
recognise that ‘the identities and cultures of Indigenous Peoples are inextricably linked to 
the lands on which they live and the natural resources on which they depend’.17 The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) has also acknowledged the importance 
                                                          
15 For an overview of the subsequent history of the draft declaration, see UN Doc 
E/CN.4/AC.4/1998/1/Add.1. 
16 Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO 169) (1989) 28 
ILM 1382, Art 13.  
17 World Bank Operational Policy (OP) 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples (2005), para 2. See also World 
Bank, BP 4.10 (2005).  
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of recognising indigenous peoples’ specific and fundamental attachment to their traditional 
territory. The ACHPR recognises that indigenous peoples have ‘a special attachment to and 
use of their traditional land, whereby their ancestral land and territory have a fundamental 
importance for their collective physical and cultural survival as peoples’.18 Overall, looking at 
the development of international law with regard to indigenous peoples’ rights to land, 
there is a clear evolution towards the recognition of indigenous peoples’ specific relationship 
with their traditional territories. This recognition was seen as an important step and was 
reaffirmed during the drafting of the Declaration. As a result, Article 25 affirms that:  
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual 
relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, 
waters and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities to future 
generations in this regard.19  
In this Article, the Declaration recognises not only indigenous peoples’ specific spiritual 
attachment to their lands but also their inter-generational approach to land rights. This 
inter-generational aspect is important as indigenous peoples have insisted that not only is 
land not a commodity but it also part of their heritage to be transmitted from generation to 
generation.20 As summarised by Lars Andres Baer: ‘Without the land and the knowledge that 
                                                          
18 Advisory Opinion of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41st Ordinary Session, Accra, Ghana, May 2007.  
19 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by GA Res 61/295, 13 
September 2007.  
20 J Gilbert, ‘Seeking the Fair Land: Indigenous Peoples as Custodians of their Lands’ in W Logan, M 
Langfield and M Mairead (eds), Cultural Diversity, Heritage and Human Rights (London, Routledge, 
2009). 
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comes mainly from use of the land, we as indigenous peoples cannot survive.’21 This specific 
cultural relationship to land is not only embedded in the present but is derived from the past 
and reaches into the future. Indigenous peoples’ specific relationship with their land has 
three temporal dimensions to it: 
(a) Past: indigenous peoples have a historical continuity with ‘pre-invasion’ and ‘pre-
colonial societies’ that developed on their territories. 
(b) Present: indigenous peoples live on these territories (or part of them).22  
(c) Future: indigenous peoples are determined to transmit to future generations their 
ancestral territories. 
The Declaration’s recognition of the inter-generational facet of indigenous peoples’ 
relationship to land can thus be seen as an important source of affirmation. Its reference to 
responsibilities towards future generations is perhaps indicative of international law’s 
willingness to start addressing the relatively underdeveloped arena of the legal obligations 
and rights that flow from inter-generational considerations. Regarding the affirmation of 
indigenous peoples’ specific cultural attachment to their lands, the preamble recognises ‘the 
urgent need to respect and promote the inherent rights of indigenous peoples which derive 
from their political, economic and social structures and from their cultures, spiritual 
traditions, histories and philosophies, especially their rights to their lands, territories and 
                                                          
21 Lars Anders Baer is a member of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 
President of the Saami Parliament in Sweden, and a member of the Saami Council. See LA Baer, 
‘Protection of Rights of Holders of Traditional Knowledge, Indigenous and Local Communities’ (2002) 
12 World Libraries 17. 
22 UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/Add.4. 
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resources’. The Declaration acknowledges that indigenous peoples’ relationship with their 
lands and territories is to be treated specifically, in a way which recognises indigenous 
peoples’ holistic approach to land rights.  
Emphasising the importance of respecting indigenous peoples’ holistic approach to land 
rights, Article 8 states that any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing 
indigenous peoples of their lands falls within the category of forced assimilation or cultural 
destruction. This article is the result of intense negotiations on the meaning of genocide in 
the Declaration. The original text proposed by the Sub-Commission to the former 
Commission on Human Rights established a clear link between so-called ‘cultural genocide’ 
(or ‘ethnocide)’ and ‘any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing’ indigenous 
peoples of their lands.23 There was a clear attempt to link dispossession of land with acts of 
genocide. During the drafting process some indigenous representatives highlighted that 
‘land was a key component of indigenous culture and dispossession of land was paramount 
to ethnocide’.24 Many indigenous representatives stated that their removal from their 
traditional territories often amounted to cultural genocide, as the practice of dispossession, 
forced relocation or population transfer amounted to the destruction of their community. 
The adoption of Article 7 of the draft declaration would have established a clear link 
between land dispossession and international criminal prosecution.25 However, this 
connection between land dispossession and genocide (or cultural genocide/ethnocide) was 
                                                          
23 UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56, UN draft declaration, Art 7. 
24 UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/98 paras 73 and 74 and page 33.  
25 Note that the draft declaration used the term ‘aim or effect’, a requirement which is less onerous 
than the ‘specific intent’ threshold. See especially J Gilbert, ‘Environmental Degradation as a Threat to 
Life: A Question of Justice?’ (2003) 6 Trinity College Law Review 81. 
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strongly resisted by states and consequently the terms ‘cultural genocide’ and ‘ethnocide’ 
do not appear in the text adopted by the General Assembly. In many ways, Article 8 reflects 
a middle ground agreement by recognising that dispossession of land is a threat to 
indigenous peoples’ cultures and could be akin to an act of forced assimilation but not an act 
of genocide per se. Hence, Article 8 recognises the crucial connection between indigenous 
peoples’ survival and land rights but remains in conformity with international law on 
genocide, which does not recognise cultural genocide or ethnocide.26 In addition, Article 10 
of the Declaration adds that ‘indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their 
lands or territories’. Overall, this part of the Declaration emphasises land as a key 
component of indigenous cultures, with dispossession consequently recognised as being 
paramount to cultural destruction.  
Collective Land Rights: Content and Limitations 
One of the critical battles that took place during the prolonged drafting process of the 
Declaration was centred on the issue of collective rights. During one of the sessions of the 
United Nations Working Group on a Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(WGDD), indigenous representatives highlighted that ‘exercise of our collective rights is not 
only critical to indigenous spirituality, but also [to] maintaining the inter-generational nature 
of all our social, cultural, economic and political rights’.27 They also pointed out that ‘a key 
                                                          
26 For a discussion of the connection between genocide and land rights for indigenous peoples, see 
Gilbert (n 4) ch 3. More generally on the issue of genocide, see W Schabas, Genocide in International 
Law: The Crimes of Crimes (Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
27 Proposals by Indigenous Representatives, 7th session of the WGDD, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/98, 
Annex II, page 28.  
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element of indigenous collective rights is the profound social, cultural, economic and 
spiritual relationship of indigenous peoples with our lands, territories, resources and 
environment’.28 On the other side several states, including the United Kingdom and France, 
insisted on the ‘inexistence’ of collective rights under international law. One of the anxieties 
concerned the potential difficulties that might emerge in cases of antagonism between 
individual and collective rights. As a result, the preamble to the Declaration recognises and 
affirms that ‘indigenous individuals are entitled without discrimination to all human rights 
recognized in international law, and that indigenous peoples possess collective rights which 
are indispensable for their existence, well-being and integral development as peoples’. 
Article 1 also highlights that indigenous peoples have rights ‘as a collective or as individuals’. 
While several articles in the Declaration make a distinction between indigenous peoples and 
indigenous individuals, the articles dealing with land rights do not make such a distinction. 
They recognise that when it comes to land rights the subjects of rights are indigenous 
peoples, not individuals.  
Despite some states’ arguments regarding the ‘non-existence’ of collective rights under 
international law, the recognition of collective rights to land for indigenous peoples is 
consistent with other existing legal standards. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACHR) in the Awas Tingni case clearly affirmed the right to property in lands for ‘members 
of indigenous communities within the framework of commonality of possession’.29 ILO 
Convention 169 also recognises the collective nature of property in lands for indigenous 
peoples, and the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee (HRC) and the Committee 
                                                          
28 ibid. 
29 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua (Series C No 79) [2001] IACHR 9 (31 August 
2001). 
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on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) also emphasises the 
collective nature of this connection.30 Hence, on this issue, the Declaration conforms to 
other international standards, and all point towards the emergence of the recognition of 
indigenous peoples’ collective rights to land. Moreover, it was important for the Declaration 
to recognise the need for greater protection of these collective rights as, to date, 
international law has been inadequate in the provision of this much-needed protection. In 
terms of the substance of such collective rights, it is worth analysing in detail the content of 
the Declaration, which makes some important contributions regarding notions of (1) 
ownership in the present tense; (2) recognition of indigenous peoples’ traditional customary 
land laws; and (3) affirmation of rights to territories and lands as including natural resources.  
Ownership: ‘Past and Present’  
In terms of the content of indigenous peoples’ right to land, Article 26 affirms that 
‘Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories 
and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional 
occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired’. In making this 
broad affirmation the Declaration does not get into the debate on what indigenous peoples’ 
land rights do or do not constitute. Traditionally on this issue there has been some debate as 
to whether land rights for indigenous peoples means a right to ownership or a right to use 
the land.31 The Declaration avoids such questions by adopting a broad approach to the 
content of a right to land, which means not only a right of ownership and use but also a right 
to develop and control. This is an important step, and one which rejects any narrow 
                                                          
30 CERD, General Comment XXIII (51) on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (adopted at the 
Committee’s 1235th meeting, 18 August 1997) para 5.  
31 Gilbert (n 4). 
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approach to land rights as meaning only a right to use, an approach sometimes favoured by 
states. Crucially, the Declaration recognises that with ownership comes control over 
developments undertaken in indigenous lands.  
However, the recognition of indigenous peoples’ right to ‘own, use, develop and control’ 
their lands comes at a price: it is limited to present day occupation. Article 26 makes a 
distinction between rights to lands ‘presently’ occupied by indigenous peoples and rights to 
land ‘traditionally’ occupied by indigenous peoples. This distinction is the result of intense 
negotiation in which some states were reluctant to recognise indigenous peoples’ land rights 
to traditionally owned territories that are now out of indigenous peoples’ control. Australia, 
for example, underlined that it could only support the text of Article 26 if it applied to lands 
that indigenous peoples currently owned or exclusively used.32 As a result, Article 26 makes 
a distinction between traditional territories and land now in possession of indigenous 
peoples and those that are not. Under paragraph 1 indigenous peoples have ‘the right to the 
lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise 
used or acquired’; while under paragraph 2 they have ‘the right to own, use, develop and 
control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional 
ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have 
otherwise acquired’. The content of the ‘right’ in paragraph 1 remains somewhat ambiguous 
as it mentions a ‘right’ to the lands but does not qualify whether it is a right to own, use, 
control or develop. The ambiguity associated with the right to land traditionally owned but 
no longer occupied by indigenous peoples could be seen as an ‘ambiguous compromise’: 
ambiguous because it will be up to national jurisdictions to interpret what rights indigenous 
                                                          
32 Report of the Working Group established in accordance with Commission on Human Rights 
Resolution 1995/32, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/92 (6 January 2003), para 32.  
 15
peoples have to the lands that they have traditionally owned, occupied or used in the past; 
and a compromise because it does not adopt the position of those states which wanted to 
ensure that land rights were only recognised in terms of land presently occupied. Such 
‘ambiguous compromise’ is not surprising as the issue of land rights over historical and 
traditional territories touches on the contentious issue of ‘dealing with the past’. In many 
ways this relates to the issue of reparations for past wrongs, an issue with which, 
traditionally, international law has not been at ease.33  
Article 26 is not the only article dealing with historical claims. The entire Declaration could 
be seen as an attempt to address the issue of reparation of past wrongs, as one of the 
overriding goals of the Declaration is reconciliation. The preamble recognises that 
‘indigenous peoples have suffered from historic injustices as a result of, inter alia, their 
colonisation and dispossession of their lands, territories and resources, thus preventing 
them from exercising, in particular, their right to development in accordance with their own 
needs and interests’. So not only does the Declaration recognise that indigenous peoples 
have suffered in the past, it also affirms that such historical dispossession still has some 
impact on indigenous peoples’ lives nowadays. This underlines one of the philosophies 
behind the Declaration, which is to recognise past wrongs and to address present day 
situations by building a bridge between them. Land rights are the cornerstone of such a 
bridge. One of the difficult issues in the Declaration was the notion of reparations and 
remedies for past wrongs. Originally the draft declaration proposed by the former Sub-
                                                          
33 See generally G Ulrich and K Boserup (eds), Reparations: Redressing Past Wrongs, Human Rights in 
Development Yearbook (Oslo, Kluwer Law International, 2003); and E Barkan, The Guilt of Nations: 
Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000). 
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Commission referred to a right to restitution of lands in its Article 27.34 Due to resistance on 
the part of some states towards the recognition of a right to restitution of lands, Article 28 
of the Declaration develops a ‘right to redress’ instead.35 It reads:  
Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include restitution or, when 
this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and 
resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have 
been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior and informed 
consent. 
Restitution of land becomes part of a larger right to redress, not the main principle. Yet, the 
Declaration affirms the rule that restitution should be the first principle, and only when it is 
not possible should other methods of compensation be contemplated. This approach 
reflects the position adopted by CERD in its General Comment XXIII, which states that ‘only 
when this is for factual reasons not possible, the right to restitution should be substituted by 
the right to just, fair and prompt compensation. Such compensation should as far as possible 
take the form of lands and territories.’36  
Overall, on the issue of collective land ownership, while the Declaration makes a distinction 
between lands presently occupied (right to own, use, develop and control) and lands 
historically occupied (a right to lands), such division is attenuated by the affirmation of a 
                                                          
34 ‘Indigenous peoples have the right to the restitution of the lands, territories and resources which 
they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, 
occupied, used or damaged without their free and informed consent.’ UN draft declaration, Art 27. 
35 J Gilbert, ‘Indigenous Rights in the Making: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples’ (2007) 14 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 207. 
36 CERD, General Recommendation 23 Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc A/52/18, Annex V, para 5. 
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regime for remedies for past wrongs which includes a right to land restitution. The 
affirmation of a right to redress, and a right to restitution, is crucial as in many ways the 
question of land rights is often a question of restoring lands that were taken under a past 
discriminatory enterprise and linked to a continuing denial of indigenous peoples’ rights. 
From this perspective, the recognition of an ambiguous ‘right to lands’ traditionally occupied 
has to be coupled with the affirmation of a right to redress and restitution. Moreover, 
regarding the link between past and present occupation, the Declaration also insists on the 
need for states to recognise that indigenous peoples’ land rights derive from traditional 
occupation and indigenous laws and customs relating to land ownership. This may be seen 
as another positive step towards reconciliation between past practices, which rejected 
indigenous peoples’ own customary land laws, and the present situation.  
Laws, Traditions and Customs: Recognition and Adjudication  
Regarding the content of a collective right to land for indigenous peoples, another crucial 
aspect of such a right concerns its source and origin. While most indigenous communities 
have elaborated traditional laws and customs regarding land rights, such laws are usually 
ignored, not recognised, or not respected by states’ formalised legal systems.37 This non-
recognition of indigenous peoples’ own laws regarding land rights is an important area of 
contention between states and indigenous peoples, which often result in the latter losing 
their rights to their lands. On this issue Article 26 of the Declaration affirms that when states 
give legal protection to indigenous peoples’ land rights they should do so with ‘due respect’ 
for indigenous peoples’ customary laws. More specifically, paragraph 3 of Article 26 affirms 
that ‘States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and 
                                                          
37 See generally D Roy, Traditional Customary Laws and Indigenous Peoples in Asia (Minority Rights 
Group International, March 2005). 
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resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions 
and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.’ This is an important 
affirmation given that in most situations indigenous peoples are dispossessed of their lands 
as a result of state authorities’ non-recognition of their traditional forms of land tenure 
systems. On this issue the Declaration goes even further by calling on states to recognise 
indigenous peoples’ customary systems of laws when recognising and adjudicating land 
rights. Article 27 reads: 
States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned, a fair, 
independent, impartial, open and transparent process, giving due recognition to indigenous 
peoples’ laws, traditions, customs and land tenure systems, to recognize and adjudicate the 
rights of indigenous peoples pertaining to their lands, territories and resources, including those 
which were traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used. Indigenous peoples shall have 
the right to participate in this process. 
This article provides for a sort of ‘guideline’ or ‘framework’, inviting states to put in place a 
‘transparent process’ at the national level that gives space to indigenous peoples’ customary 
laws. The emphasis is on the need for states to establish a process that will recognise 
indigenous peoples’ customary land laws. This part of the Declaration does not argue for a 
rejection of the formal state systems and for the application of indigenous peoples’ own 
laws only; rather the aim is to encourage states to establish a process which will give ‘due 
respect’ to indigenous laws. It is important to highlight that such a process will play a role 
not only in the adjudication of land rights but also in the process of recognition of such 
rights. This provides more space for the recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights based on 
their own traditional ownership rather than official state recognition of such rights—again 
an approach based on the idea of reconciliation between states’ institutions and indigenous 
peoples.  
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Regarding the operationalistion of such recognition, one might find this part of the 
Declaration disappointing: while it supports the establishment of a ‘transparent process’ it 
does not provide details on how such a process should work. At this stage it is important to 
bear in mind that the aim of the Declaration is to set basic minimum international standards 
and to affirm the need to give due recognition to indigenous peoples’ own laws. For 
centuries, legal institutions at the international and national levels have dismissed 
indigenous customary systems of laws as being ‘backward’ or ‘uncivilised’.38 The Declaration 
attempts to contribute to the redress of this injustice by calling on states to put in a place a 
‘transparent process’ which gives space to indigenous peoples’ systems of laws when it 
comes to recognition and adjudication of land rights. Regarding practical implementation of 
such an obligation, one of the only limitations is set out in Article 34 of the Declaration, 
which states that indigenous peoples’ customs have to be in accordance with international 
human rights standards. This addresses one of the issues raised by some of the states 
involved in the drafting of the Declaration regarding potential conflicts between customary 
laws and human rights law, in particular the rights of women with regard to familial and 
inheritance rights. The Declaration, otherwise, provides the framework for states, in 
cooperation with indigenous peoples, to develop systems that will give some space for 
indigenous laws, traditions and customs. The processes employed to develop these systems 
are required to be open, participative and transparent.  
Rights over Natural Resources  
Another important component of indigenous peoples’ collective rights to their land is the 
recognition of their rights over the resources contained in those lands. Article 26 affirms that 
                                                          
38 See generally Anghie (n 11); Keal (n 10); and L Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). 
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indigenous peoples’ land rights (presently and traditionally occupied) refer to a right over 
lands, territories and resources. This recognition is particularly significant when viewed in 
the context of the increased global demand for primary natural resources, much of which 
are located within indigenous peoples’ territories. Control over natural resources is an area 
of historical and ongoing conflict between states, indigenous peoples and other private 
actors such as transnational corporations that are increasingly encroaching on indigenous 
peoples’ territories to exploit natural resources located therein. Hence, the recognition that 
land rights also means control over natural resources is an affirmation which has potentially 
profound implications for indigenous peoples. As with other potentially far-reaching 
provisions of the Declaration, this acknowledgement on the part of states is the result of 
prolonged debate during the drafting process, with some states, often notably those most 
active in the area of resource exploitation on indigenous peoples’ lands both at home and 
abroad, reluctant to recognise rights over natural resources.  
Moreover, it is worth noting that on this issue of ownership and control over natural 
resources ILO Convention 169 recognises a right to use such resources rather than a right of 
ownership.39 During the drafting of ILO 169 there was intense debate as to whether land 
rights should include rights over natural resources. Several states argued that ownership of 
natural resources was exclusively reserved to states and that in most national legislations 
                                                          
39 Art 15 states: ‘The rights of the peoples concerned to the natural resources pertaining to their lands 
shall be specially safeguarded. These rights include the right of these peoples to participate in the use, 
management and conservation of these resources.’ 
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such resources could be granted to private individuals on a concessionary basis only.40 Due 
to this insistence of states and arguably a reduced voice of indigenous peoples due to a less 
than inclusive drafting process, the ILO Convention makes a distinction between a right to 
own land and territories and a right to use natural resources. The Declaration, with its 
recognition of the right to own, use, control and develop resources, reflects the position of 
indigenous peoples and the contemporary challenges they face in relation to their cultural 
survival.  
This recognition is part of a larger evolution of international law on the issue of indigenous 
peoples’ rights in relation to natural resources. The IACHR has been especially active in 
examining issues relating to the rights of indigenous peoples over natural resources. In the 
landmark decision of Awas Tigni the Court asserted that the term ‘property’ used in Article 
21 of the American Convention includes ‘those material things which can be possessed, as 
well as any right which may be part of a person’s patrimony; that concept includes all 
movables and immovables, corporeal and incorporeal elements and any other intangible 
object capable of having value’.41 Likewise, in the case of the Yakye Axa community the 
Court pointed out that ‘the close ties of indigenous peoples with their traditional territories 
and the natural resources therein associated with their culture, as well as the components 
                                                          
40 See especially the debates of the Working Party: International Labour Conference, Partial Revision 
of the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957 (No 107), Provisional Record 25, 76th 
session, Geneva, 1988. 
41 Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua (n 29) para 144. 
 22
derived from them, must be safeguarded by Article 21 of the American Convention’.42 More 
recently the Court confirmed and refined its position in the Saramaka case, stating: 
the right to use and enjoy their territory would be meaningless in the context of indigenous and 
tribal communities if said right were not connected to the natural resources that lie on and 
within the land. That is, the demand for collective land ownership by members of indigenous 
and tribal peoples derives from the need to ensure the security and permanence of their control 
and use of the natural resources, which in turn maintains their very way of life. This 
connectedness between the territory and the natural resources necessary for their physical and 
cultural survival is precisely what needs to be protected under Article 21 of the Convention in 
order to guarantee the members of indigenous and tribal communities’ right to the use and 
enjoyment of their property. From this analysis, it follows that the natural resources found on 
and within indigenous and tribal people’s territories that are protected under Article 21 are 
those natural resources traditionally used and necessary for the very survival, development and 
continuation of such people’s way of life.43 
This decision of the IACHR, highlighting that it would be ‘meaningless’ to recognise land 
rights for indigenous peoples without recognising their rights over natural resources, mirrors 
the rationale adopted in the UN Declaration linking control over natural resources with 
indigenous peoples’ survival. This position is illustrative of the evolution in the recognition of 
indigenous peoples’ land rights and an increased awareness of the profound impact that 
external forces, such as unwanted exploitation of natural recourses, can have on their 
cultural survival, which has occurred since the adoption of ILO Convention 169 some 20 
years ago. To protect and give effect to these recognised rights to territories, lands and 
                                                          
42 Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs), IACHR, judgment of 
17 June 2005, Series C No 125 (2005). 
43 Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname (Series C No 172) [2007] IACHR 5 (28 November 2007) 
para 122. 
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resources in the context of unwanted exploitation, the Declaration requires that states 
obtain indigenous peoples’ free, prior and informed consent (FPIC).  
The Requirement to Obtain FPIC: Natural Evolution  
or Groundbreaking Development?44 
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, activities such as mining, logging, dam 
construction and mono-cropping are becoming synonymous with violations of indigenous 
peoples’ rights. These economic development projects, executed for the most part without 
the adequate participation of indigenous peoples, have had a serious impact on their well-
being. The former Special Rapporteur on indigenous people and their relationship to land, 
Erica-Irene Daes,  described the associated problem of expropriation of indigenous lands and 
resources without indigenous peoples’ consent as ‘growing and severe’.45 This widespread 
phenomenon of imposing projects on indigenous peoples without their consent has come to 
be termed by indigenous peoples as ‘development aggression’.46 This is particularly 
                                                          
44 This section of the chapter is based on Cathal Doyle’s doctoral thesis which addresses the 
operationalization of Free Prior and Informed Consent in the extractive sector. See also Doyle, Cathal, 
“Free, prior and informed consent: a universal norm and framework for consultation and benefit 
sharing in relation to indigenous peoples and the extractive sector”, submission made to the UN 
OHCHR Workshop on Extractive Industries, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights, Moscow in 
December 2008 Available at ww2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/resource_companies.htm.  
45 E-I Daes, Indigenous Peoples’ Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/30/Add.1, para 7. 
46 Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 4th session, New York, 16–27 May 2005, Special Theme: 
Millennium Development Goals Information Received from the United Nations System, 
E/C.19/2005/4/Add.13, 28 March 2005, paras 3-6; see also Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
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pervasive in the extractive sector and its negative impact on indigenous peoples has been 
described as enormous.47 The associated ongoing violations of indigenous peoples’ rights, 
combined with increased demand and prices for minerals and the fact that much of the 
world’s remaining mineral resources are located in indigenous territories,48 has led many 
indigenous peoples to conclude that development aggression in the area of natural resource 
extraction poses a grave threat to their cultural survival.49 Given this context, it is hardly 
surprising that the unprecedented volume and scale of extractive projects currently being 
planned in indigenous territories is escalating tensions and conflict between indigenous 
peoples, states and transnational corporations. 
International Human Rights Law and FPIC 
The former UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) pointed to the ruling of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Western Sahara case as evidence that consent 
                                                                                                                                                                      
situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people (R Stavenhagen), 21 
January 2003, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90, para 28. 
47 J Ruggie, Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2006/97, paras 25, 29. 
48 R Moody, Rocks and Hard Places (London, Zed Books, 2007) 10; see also AA Tujan, Jr and RB 
Guzman, Globalizing Philippine Mining (Manila IBON Foundation Inc Databank and Research Centre, 
IBON Books, 2002) 153.  
49 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
indigenous people (R Stavenhagen), Mission to Philippines (2002) UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90/Add.3, 
para 63. See also Report of the Special Rapporteur (n 46) para 20, providing examples of 
developments that are threatening the existence of indigenous peoples in locations around the world. 
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has formed the basis of agreements between states and indigenous peoples since as far 
back as 1975.50 Others point to the fact that consent as a principle in relation to dealings 
with indigenous peoples has been operational for hundreds of years, dating back to the 
original treaties negotiated with indigenous peoples by colonisers.51 Regardless of when 
consent was initially established as a principle in relation to negotiations between states and 
indigenous peoples, it is clear that the adoption of FPIC as a general principle in negotiations 
with indigenous peoples has gained significant momentum in recent years. This momentum 
is reflected in the fact that FPIC is increasingly referenced in international instruments and 
fora ranging from general comments, recommendations and concluding observations of UN 
treaty bodies to jurisprudence of treaty bodies and regional courts, reports and analyses of 
UN special procedures and legislation, and jurisprudence emerging from national 
jurisdictions. In recognition of the importance of FPIC, the PFII and the WGIP worked on 
developing methodologies and legal frameworks aimed at promoting the principle of FPIC 
and assisting with its implementation.52 ILO Convention 169, the only international treaty 
                                                          
50 International Court of Justice, Western Sahara: Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975 [1975] ICJ Rep 
12. The ICJ advisory opinion refers the ‘freely expressed will and desire’ of a people. See M Janis, ‘The 
International Court of Justice: Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara’ (1976) 17 Harvard 
International Law Journal 609. For an analysis of the self-determination issue in the Western Sahara 
see J Castellino, International Law and Self Determination: The Interplay of Politics of Territorial 
Possession with Formulations of Post-Colonial ‘National’ Identity (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2000). 
51 M Colchester and F MacKay, ‘In Search of Middle Ground: Indigenous Peoples, Collective 
Representation and the Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent’, Forest Peoples Programme, 
August 2004, www.forestpeoples.org.  
52 Report of the International Workshop on Methodologies regarding Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent, and Indigenous Peoples, New York, 17–19 January 2005, UN Doc E/C.19/2005/3; WGIP 
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specifically dedicated to indigenous peoples, contains an explicit reference to indigenous 
peoples’ informed consent in the context of relocation. It also recognises indigenous 
peoples’ right to ‘decide their own priorities for the process of development’ and requires 
that states consult with them through their representative institution, ‘with the objective of 
achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures’.53  
The HRC, the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) and CERD have all 
clarified that the right to self-determination applies to indigenous peoples.54 Consistent with 
this recognition of the right to self-determination these treaty bodies have pointed to state 
duty to seek and obtain FPIC in the context of activities impacting on indigenous peoples’ 
rights and interests.55 Both CERD and the CESCR have instructed states that indigenous 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Standard-Setting Legal Commentary on the Concept of Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Expanded 
Working Paper submitted by AI Motoc, E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2005/WP.1, 14 July 2005.  
53 ILO Convention 169 (1989) Art 6. Art 15 requires consultation in the context of exploration or 
exploitation of subsoil resources.  
54 HRC: Australia UN Doc CCPR/C/69/AUS (2000) para 10, Mexico CCPR/C/79/Add.109 (1999) para 19, 
Canada CCPR/C/79/Add.105 (1999), paras 7 and 8, Sweden CCPR/C/74/SWE (2002) para 15, Norway 
CCPR/C/79/Add. 112 (1999) paras 10 and 17 and Denmark CCPR/C/70/DNK (2000) para 11. CESCR: 
Russian Federation UN doc E/C.12/1/Add.94 (2003), Para 39; the Philippines UN Doc 
E/C.12/PHL/CO/4 (2008), para 16; Sweden E/C.12/SWE/CO/5 (2008) para 15. CERD General Comment 
XXI (1996) clarifies that self-determination applies to ‘all peoples’ Its General Comment XXIII on 
‘indigenous peoples’ is an implicit recognition of this right to self-determination as ‘peoples’.  
55 The terminology used by the treaty bodies relation to the requirement for consent varies from the 
weaker formulations of ‘seek’ / ‘endeavour to obtain’ FPIC, to the stronger formulations of ‘obtain’ / 
‘require’ FPIC. For examples of the latter CERD Concluding observations to Ecuador 
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peoples’ consent is required in the context of extractive  projects.56 In 2009, in its ruling on 
the Poma-Poma v Peru case, the HRC stated that for indigenous participation in decision-
making to be effective their FPIC was required and that ‘mere consultation’ was inadequate 
to ensure protection of their rights under Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR).57 This ruling was consistent with the HRC’s 1994 decision in the 
case of Lansman v Finland, where it  clarified that the scope of a state’s freedom with regard 
to development on indigenous peoples’ lands cannot be ‘assessed by reference to a margin 
of appreciation but by reference to the obligations it has undertaken in Article 27’.58 To date 
CERD has been the most engaged and innovative international human rights body on the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
CERD/C/ECU/CO/19 15 (2008); CERD’s Early Warning Urgent Action letter to the Philippine 
Government (7 March 2008) and HRC Poma-Poma v Peru UN Doc CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006 ( 
24 April 2009).  
56 See CERD, General Comment XXIII (n 30). See also CERD, Concluding Observations on Ecuador, 
2003, CERD/C/62/CO/2: ‘as to the exploitation of subsoil resources located subjacent to the 
traditional lands of indigenous communities the Committee observes that mere consultation of these 
communities prior to exploitation falls short of meeting the requirements set out in General 
Comment XXIII on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The Committee therefore recommends that the 
prior informed consent of these communities be sought’; CESCR Concluding Observations on Ecuador, 
32nd session, 26 April–14 May 2004, E/C.12/1/Add.100, paras 12 and 35; CESCR Concluding 
Observations on Colombia, 27th session, 12–30 November 2001, E/C.12/1/Add.74, paras 12 and 33  
57 HRC Poma Poma v Peru (n 55) Paras 7.6 and 7.4. Complaint taken against Peru in 2006 under the 
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. 
58 Lansman v Finland, Communication No 511/1992, UN Doc CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (1994), para 9.4 
the Committee clarified that ‘measures whose impact amount to a denial of the right [to culture] will 
not be compatible with the obligations under article 27’. 
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subject of FPIC. Its General Comment XXIII, issued in 1997, on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples states that ‘no decisions directly relating to their rights and interests are taken 
without their informed consent’.59 The focus of CERD’s current work in relation to 
indigenous peoples is reflective of the increased emphasis being placed on FPIC following 
the adoption of the Declaration. In addition to an increased emphasis on the requirement to 
obtain FPIC in its concluding observations to states,60 CERD is currently examining cases in 
countries including Brazil, Botswana, Canada, Niger, the Philippines, Peru, India and 
Indonesia in the context of its Early Warning Urgent Action procedure, and has asked those 
states’ respective governments to respond to allegations regarding their failure to obtain the 
FPIC of the affected indigenous peoples.61   
Support for the affirmation of a right to FPIC can also be found in reports and declarations of 
UN Special Rapporteurs. The former Special Rapporteur on the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, emphasised the 
importance of the ‘right to free prior and informed consent by indigenous peoples’, which 
includes their ‘right to say no’, describing it as being of ‘crucial concern’ in relation to large-
                                                          
59 CERD, General Comment XXIII (n 30) para 4(d). 
60 Ecuador UN Doc CERD/C/ECU/CO/19 (2008), Russia UN Doc CERD/C/RUS/CO/19 20 (2008), and 
Philippines UN Doc CERD/C/PHL/CO/20, (2009) addressing FPIC for resource exploitation. 
61 See Early Warning Urgent Action letters sent following CERD’s 73rd, 74th and 75th sessions, 2008 - 
2010, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/early-warning.htm.  
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scale or major development projects and ‘essential’ for the protection of their human 
rights.62  
The current Special Rapporteur, S James Anaya, has argued that we are witnessing the 
development of an international norm requiring the consent of indigenous peoples when 
their property rights are impacted by natural resource extraction.63 The Rapporteur 
addressed the issue of FPIC in his 2009 annual report to the Human Rights Council and in 
communications and statements to the Ecuadorian and Peruvian governments in 2008 and 
2010 respectively.64 In his comments on FPIC the Rapporteur cited the UN Declaration and 
                                                          
62 Report of the Special Rapporteur (n 46) paras 13 and 66. He points out that FPIC is necessary as too 
many major developments do not respect the consultation and participation criteria that are laid out 
in ILO Convention 169. 
63 SJ Anaya, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Participatory Rights in Relation to Decisions about Natural Resource 
Extraction’ (2005) 22 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 17: ‘Where property 
rights are affected by natural resource extraction, the international norm is developing to also require 
actual consent by the indigenous peoples concerned.’ See also F MacKay, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
and Resource Exploitation’ (2004) 12 Philippines Natural Resources Law Journal 58. 
64 In the case of Ecuador the Special Rapporteur addressed the requirement for FPIC in response to a 
request for advice regarding the drafting of its constitution. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people (S James Anaya), 
Addendum A/HRC/9/9/Add.1, 15 August 2008, Annex 1. In the case of Peru the Rapporteur addressed 
the requirement for consent in relation to legislative developments following his country visit, see 
‘Declaración pública del Relator Especial sobre los derechos humanos y libertades fundamentales de 
los indígenas, James Anaya, sobre la “Ley del derecho a la consulta previa a los pueblos indígenas u 
originarios reconocido en el Convenio No. 169 de la Organización Internacional de Trabajo” aprobada 
por el Congreso de la República del Perú’ 7 de julio de 2010.  
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the recent IACHR Saramaka v Suriname ruling,65 holding that measures which have a 
potentially substantial impact on the basic physical and/or cultural well-being of an 
indigenous community should not proceed without their consent.66 The Rapporteur 
proposed that the extent of the obligation to obtain consent be a function of the potential 
impact of a proposed measure on indigenous peoples’ lives and territories, with significant 
and direct impacts leading to a ‘strong presumption’ of the requirement for consent. He 
further noted that this requirement could ‘in certain contexts’ ‘harden into a prohibition of 
the measure or project in the absence of indigenous consent.’67 In his 2010 statement to the 
Government of Peru the Rapporteur noted that the UN DRIP indicated that consent was a 
requirement, as opposed to merely an objective, under Article 32 for extractive projects 
which may have significant social, cultural or environmental impacts on indigenous 
peoples.68  
The UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP), established by the 
Human Rights Council, is also in the process of addressing the right to FPIC. Having 
                                                          
65 Report of the Special Rapporteur 2008  (n 64). See also Saramaka People v Suriname (n 43).  
66 Report of the Special Rapporteur 2008 (n 64) para 39 
67 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
indigenous people, James Anaya 15 July 2009 UN Doc A/HRC/12/34 Para 47 
68 Declaración pública del Relator Especial (n 64) ‘El Relator Especial agregaría además, como ejemplo 
en el que se requiere el consentimiento indígena, el caso de una propuesta de instalación de 
actividades de extracción de recursos naturales dentro de un territorio indígena cuando esas 
actividades tuviesen impactos sociales, culturales y ambientales significativos.’ The Rapporteur also 
noted that consent was a requirement in the situations covered under Articles 10 (relocation) and 29 
(disposal of hazardous materials) of the Declaration. 
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recommended at its 1st session in October 2008 that the Durban Declaration and 
Programme of Action ‘should acknowledge that both the right to self determination and the 
principle of FPIC are now universally recognized through the adoption of the Declaration’,69 
the EMRIP proceeded to examine the issue in more detail at its 3rd session in the context of 
its draft study on indigenous peoples’ right to participate in decision making. The draft 
study,  notes that indigenous peoples view the right to FPIC as ‘a requirement, prerequisite 
and manifestation of the exercise of their right to self-determination’ and that particular 
emphasis is placed on FPIC in the context of large-scale natural resource extraction.70 
Likewise the PFII dedicated its 9th session in 2010 to the issue of development with culture 
and identity in accordance with Article 3 (self-determination) and Article 32 (development 
and FPIC) of the Declaration. 
At the regional level the IACHR has recently reaffirmed the requirement for FPIC, citing 
Article 32 of the Declaration in its November 2007 ruling on the Saramaka v Suriname case. 
It stated: ‘the Court considers that, regarding large-scale development or investment 
projects that would have a major impact within Saramaka territory, the state has a duty, not 
only to consult with the Saramaka, but also to obtain their free, prior, and informed consent, 
according to their customs and traditions.’71 The Inter-American Court and Commission 
respectively, previously identified the requirement for consent in the cases of the Awas 
                                                          
69 Report of the expert mechanism on the rights of indigenous peoples on its first session 
A/HRC/10/56 (8 January 2009) page 4  
70 ‘Progress report on the study on indigenous peoples and the right to participate in decision-making. 
Report of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ UN Doc A/HRC/EMRIP/2010/2 
(17 May 2010) para 34  
71 Saramaka People v Suriname (n 43) para 134.  
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Tingni v Nicaragua and Mary and Carrie Dann v The United States.72 In addition, the 
Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples contains a similar clause 
to Article 32 of the UN Declaration, requiring FPIC for ‘any plan, program or proposal 
affecting the rights or living conditions of indigenous peoples’.73 The updated procedure of 
the working group responsible for the drafting of the American Declaration requires that the 
UN DRIP serve as ‘a point of reference’ for reaching agreement on those articles where 
consensus had not yet been reached. 74 This would appear to imply that a standard lower 
than the requirement to obtain FPIC, as recognized in the UN DRIP, would not be acceptable. 
In 2009 case of Kenya v Endorois the ACHPR also affirmed the requirement for FPIC to be 
obtained in accordance with indigenous peoples’ customs and traditions in the context of 
development projects that could have a major impact in their territories.75 
At the national level a number of jurisdictions, including the Philippines, Australia’s Northern 
Territory, Venezuela and Greenland have enacted legislation recognising the requirement to 
                                                          
72 Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua (n 29) para 143 and Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, 
Case 11.140, Report No. 75/02, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Doc. 5 rev. 1 at 860 (2002) para 165 
73  ‘Eleventh meeting of negotiations in the quest for points of consensus (United States, Washington 
D.C. – April 14 to 18, 2008) Record of the current status of the draft American Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ OEA/Ser.K/XVI GT/DADIN/doc.334/08 (18 April 2008) Article XXIX page 
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74 ‘Report of the chair on the meeting for reflection on the meetings of negotiations in the quest for 
points of consensus’ OEA/Ser.K/XVI GT/DADIN/doc.321/08 (14 January 2008) page 4.  
75 African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights Case 276 / 2003 – Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council 
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obtain indigenous peoples’ informed consent prior to approving activities in their 
territories.76 As a further reflection of evolving customary international law in the area of 
indigenous participation rights, a number of donor governments have also recognised the 
importance of FPIC as a key principle in safeguarding indigenous peoples’ rights. These 
include the governments of Denmark and Spain, which, along with the European 
Commission, have incorporated the principle of FPIC of indigenous peoples into their 
development strategies.77  
Jurisprudence at the national level has also recognised the duty to obtain indigenous 
peoples’ FPIC. The Supreme Court of Canada in the Delgamuukw v British Columbia case 
                                                          
76 Philippines:  Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) Republic Act No 8371 (1997) Chapter III s 3g; 
Greenland: The Greenland Home Rule Act, Act No 577, (1978), Sect 8(1) which included ‘a mutual 
right of veto’ over mining projects. This Act has been superseded by the Act on Greenland Self-
Government adopted 19 May 2009, which transfers responsibility for the mineral resource area to 
Greenland’s Self Government authorities; Venezuela: Ley Organica de Pueblos y comunidades 
Indígenas Gaceta Official de la Republica Bolivariana De Venezuela Numero 38,344 Caracas 
(2005)Chapter II Art 11 -19; Australia: Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act An Act providing 
for the granting of Traditional Aboriginal Land in the Northern Territory for the benefit of Aboriginals, 
and for other purposes. (No 191 of 1976), Sect 42. 
77 The EC has included FPIC as the key principle in development cooperation: see ’The European 
Consensus on Development, Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the 
governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the 
Commission on European Union Development Policy’, Official Journal of the European Union 2006/C 
46/01 paras 101 and 103. See also ‘Strategy for Danish Support to Indigenous Peoples’ (Danish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danida, May 2004) 11; and Report of the Government of Spain to the PFII 
6th session, 21 February 2007, UN Doc E/C.19/2007/4 para 4. 
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clarified that where aboriginal people hold title to land, the government’s duty to consult is 
‘in most cases … significantly deeper than mere consultation’ and can require the ‘full 
consent of an aboriginal nation’.78 In its October 2007 landmark ruling in Maya Villages of 
Santa Cruz and Conejo v The Attorney General of Belize and the Department of Environment 
and Natural Resources, the Supreme Court of Belize referenced the FPIC requirements in 
both the Declaration and CERD’s General Comment XXIII on the rights of indigenous peoples. 
The Court ordered that the state cease and abstain from any acts, including the granting of 
mining permits and the issuing of regulations concerning resource use, which impacted on 
the Mayan indigenous communities ‘unless such acts are pursuant to their informed 
consent’.79 In 2010 the Court reaffirmed the applicability of its 2007 ruling to all ‘the Maya 
villages in the Toledo Districts’.80 In the 2009 case of Álvaro Bailarín y otros, contra los 
Ministerios del Interior y de Justicia; de Ambiente, Vivienda y Desarrollo Territorial; de 
Defensa; de Protección Social; y de Minas y Energía the Constitutional Court of Colombia 
addressed the requirement to obtain FPIC in relation to the issuance of a concession for 
mining exploration.81 The Court ruled that the state has a duty to obtain FPIC in accordance 
with indigenous peoples’ customs and traditions where large scale investment or 
                                                          
78 Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010, para 168. 
79 Aurelio Cal and the Maya Village of Santa Cruz v Attorney General of Belize; and Manuel Coy and 
Maya Village of Conejo v Attorney General of Belize, (Consolidated) Claim Nos 171 & 172, 2007, 
Supreme Court of Belize (18 October 2007) para 136(d). 
80 The Maya Leaders Alliance and the Toledo Alcaldes Association on behalf of the Maya Villages of 
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Environment Claim No. 366, 2008 Supreme Court Of Belize (28th June 2010) para 126 (i) 
81 Constitutional Court of Colombia Sentencia T-769/09 [2009] page 36 (between n27 and 28) 
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development plans may have a major impact within their territories.82 These recent 
jurisprudential developments pertaining to FPIC illustrate the importance of the strongly 
worded and unambiguous language contained in the Declaration, particularly in relation to 
the development, utilisation and exploitation of resources. Despite the objections of some 
states to this language during the drafting and negotiating process, indigenous peoples’ 
insistence that it not be compromised prevailed. The adoption of the Declaration, which 
contains no fewer than six references to the requirement to obtain FPIC, is an 
acknowledgement by states that FPIC is, in principle (if not yet in practice), a minimum 
standard to be respected ‘for the survival, dignity and well-being of the indigenous peoples 
of the world’.83 
Scope of Requirement to Obtain FPIC in the Declaration 
The Declaration provides a normative framework for future engagement between 
indigenous peoples and states, the private sector or the UN system.84 If implemented in 
good faith it provides an opportunity to address historical power imbalances between 
indigenous peoples and those wishing to access their lands and exploit their resources. In so 
doing, it affords a unique opportunity to significantly reduce the potential for further 
development aggression and to address existing conflicts. Fundamental to, and inseparable 
from, the Declaration’s framework is respect for what indigenous peoples view as two of its 
                                                          
82 ibid 
83 Art 43. 
84 United Nations Development Group Guidelines on Indigenous Peoples’ Issues, February 2008, p 10; 
see also Statement by the Chairman, Global Indigenous Caucus, Les Malezer, 13 September 2007. 
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core principles, namely self-determination and FPIC.85 It has long been argued by indigenous 
peoples that the fulfilment of their right to self-determination is dependent on the 
recognition of their rights to lands and territories and the resources contained therein.86 
According to Erica-Irene Daes, the modern concept of self-determination, in order to be 
meaningful, ‘must logically and legally carry with it the essential right of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources’.87 This reasoning is reflected in the IACHR’s Saramaka v 
Suriname ruling that indigenous peoples’ land rights would be rendered meaningless ‘if not 
connected to the natural resources that lie on and within the land’.88 International law also 
recognises that implicit in indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination is the right to 
effective participation and consultation in relation to any measures that impact on them.89 
                                                          
85 Art 3 states: ‘Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.’ 
86 Daes (n 42) para 8: ‘[I]t has become clear that meaningful political and economic self-determination 
of indigenous peoples will never be possible without indigenous peoples’ having legal authority to 
exercise control over their lands and territories.’ 
87 ibid, para 17.  
88 Emphasis added. This qualification that resources are inclusive of those on and within lands is in line 
with the provisions of the Declaration. These provisions do not make any distinction between subsoil 
and non-subsoil resources and as such the use of the term ‘resources’ within the Declaration is 
inclusive of both. 
89 See F MacKay, Compilations of UN Treaty Body Jurisprudence Volumes I, II and III Covering the 
Years 1993–2008, Forest Peoples Programme available. See also Programme of Action of the Second 
International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People, Objective (ii). 
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The right to self-determination also embodies the ‘freely expressed will and desire’ of a 
people.90 Consequently for indigenous peoples, the standard that has crystallised as the 
basis for effective consultation and participation in the context of development in their 
territories is FPIC.91 
Fundamental to a people’s right to self-determination is their ability to chart their own 
destiny. FPIC, which provides for the right to reject projects or measures that directly impact 
on a people and thereby enable them to exercise control over their destiny, flows directly 
from this aspect of the right to self-determination. FPIC therefore is premised on and 
essential for the operationalisation of the right to self-determination. In recognition of this 
the PFII and experts have described FPIC as ‘a substantive framework’ that is integral to 
indigenous peoples’ rights to lands and resources92 and central to the exercise of their right 
to self-determination with respect to developments affecting them.93 FPIC, while of 
particular significance to issues pertaining to control over lands, territories and natural 
resources, is also essential for the realisation of other self-determination rights.94 Reflective 
                                                          
90 ICJ Western Sahara Advisory Opinion (n 50) 
91 The HRC has stated that effective participation in the decision-making process ‘requires ... the free, 
prior and informed consent of the members of the community’ Poma Poma v Peru (n 55) Para 7.6. 
92 PFII, Report of the International Workshop on Methodologies (n 52) para 41. 
93 P Tamang, Indigenous Expert, ‘An Overview of the Principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent 
and Indigenous Peoples in International and Domestic Law and Practices Contribution’, PFII Workshop 
on FPIC, UN Doc PFII/2004.WS.2/8.  
94 WGIP Standard-Setting Legal Commentary (n 52) para 33. See also ‘Statement to the Third session 
of the UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Presentation under Agenda Item 3 
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of this is the fact that references to FPIC in the Declaration are broad in scope and extend to 
such areas as redress for the taking of cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property95 
and the requirement to obtain FPIC ‘before adopting and implementing legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect’ indigenous peoples.96 
Within the context of rights to lands, territories and resources the Declaration explicitly 
requires FPIC in four contexts. First, it is required prior to any relocation of indigenous 
peoples from their lands or territories.97 Secondly, FPIC must be obtained prior to the 
storage or disposal of hazardous materials in their lands or territories.98 Thirdly, the 
Declaration affirms that indigenous peoples have a right to redress wherever ‘lands, 
territories and resources, which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or 
used … have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior 
and informed consent’.99 Finally, Article 32 addresses the contentious issue of development 
projects that impact on indigenous peoples’ lands, territories and resources. It states that: 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Cathal Doyle on behalf of University of Middlesex Department of Law & Philippines Indigenous 
Peoples Links’. Available at www.docip.org  
95 Art 11. This provision is in line with developments requiring FPIC under the Convention on Biological 
Diversity see Draft Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity. UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/COP/10/5/Add.4, Page 16 
96 Art 19.  
97 Art 10. 
98 Art 29. 
99 Art 28. 
 39
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the 
development or use of their lands or territories and other resources.  
2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned 
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent 
prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, 
particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or 
other resources. 
3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities, 
and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, 
cultural or spiritual impact. 
The first paragraph of Article 32 contextualises the requirement for FPIC which is articulated 
in the second paragraph. It frames FPIC as a prerequisite for the realization of a self-
determined development path premised on control over lands and resources.100 Viewed 
from this perspective FPIC is integral to the right to self-government and autonomy, being 
not only necessary to prevent unwanted developments, but also essential in ensuring that 
indigenous peoples shape developments by and for themselves. Consequently, FPIC is 
required for ‘any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources’. This differs 
from the FPIC protections afforded in Articles 10 and 29 in two significant ways. On the one 
hand, the focus of Article 32 is limited to projects, whereas Articles 10 and 29 are not subject 
to this restriction. On the other hand, Article 32 does not link the requirement for FPIC to 
                                                          
100 This affirmation is consistent with indigenous peoples’ right to development recognized in Article 
23 and the right to self-determination under Article 3. See C Doyle & J Gilbert Indigenous Peoples and 
Globalization: From “Development Aggression” to “Self-Determined Development” in European 
Yearbook on Minority Issues Special Focus: Contemporary Challenges of Globalization (EURAC, 
Bolzano/Bozen, forthcoming) 
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specific impacts of projects, and in this regard its scope is broader than that of Articles 10 
and 29. 
In summary, Article 32 places FPIC at the core of indigenous peoples’ right to development. 
It requires FPIC for all projects affecting indigenous peoples, and does not place any 
limitations on FPIC in relation to either the type of project or its potential impact. It does, 
however, place special emphasis on projects that involve the ‘development, utilization or 
exploitation of mineral, water or other resources’. The wording ‘any such activities’ in 
paragraph 3 would appear to imply that it should be read in the light of paragraph 2, and not 
interpreted separately as justifying the pursuit of activities without meeting the requirement 
for FPIC.101 Instead, it makes clear that even where FPIC has been given, there is a duty on 
the state to ensure that appropriate redress and mitigation measures are provided for. 
Article 32 also requires that states consult with indigenous peoples ‘in good faith’ through 
their ‘own representative institutions’. Article 33 states that indigenous peoples have the 
right to ‘determine the structures and to select the membership of their institutions in 
accordance with their own procedures’. Taken together these articles address one of the 
most common issues encountered by indigenous peoples in consultations with states and 
companies where the requirement to obtain FPIC has been recognised: that of portraying 
individuals amenable to the interests of these external entities, but who are not selected 
according to the community’s procedures, customs or traditions, as being representative of 
the community.102 A short overview of the content of the principle of FPIC or, as it is often 
interchangeably referred to, the right to FPIC, is provided in the following paragraph.  
                                                          
101 Article 28 addresses such situations requiring redress for taking or use of resources without FPIC. 
102 This was a consistent theme that emerged from regional consultations held with indigenous 
peoples in the Philippines in preparation for the ICERD indigenous peoples shadow report, July–
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FPIC, in the context of development projects, requires that good faith consultation processes 
with indigenous peoples be free from all external manipulation, coercion and intimidation; 
that the affected indigenous peoples be notified that their consent will be sought sufficiently 
in advance of the approval, or commencement, of any activities; and that there be full 
disclosure of information regarding all aspects of a potential project in a manner that is 
accessible and understandable to the indigenous people. Finally, indigenous peoples can 
approve or reject a project or activity. This decision to approve or reject should be based on 
the consensus of all indigenous people affected and be reached though their traditional 
decision-making processes and representative institutions in accordance with their 
customary laws and practices. Consent may be required at multiple phases during the 
consultation and negotiation processes and throughout the projects lifecycle. If consent is 
given following good faith negotiations it should result in a legally binding agreement that 
ensures equitable benefit sharing arrangements. Effective grievance mechanisms spanning 
the entire project lifecycle, including any post-project impacts, should be guaranteed. FPIC 
therefore establishes the processes for consultation and negotiations that have to be 
followed and imposes a requirement that the outcome of these processes be recognised and 
upheld. Both the process and outcome components of FPIC are necessary to ensure 
indigenous peoples’ effective participation in the decision-making process.  
While literature elaborating on the content and meaning of FPIC exists, work remains to be 
done in terms of assessing the mechanisms, measures and conditions required to ensure its 
                                                                                                                                                                      
August 2008 (on file with authors). The issue of representation was addressed in Saramaka People v 
Suriname (n 43) para 164: ‘[T]he question of whether certain self-identified members of the Saramaka 
people may assert certain communal rights on behalf of the juridical personality of such people is a 
question that must be resolved by the Saramaka people in accordance with their own traditional 
customs and norms, not by the State or this Court in this particular case.’ 
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meaningful implementation in practice in accordance with the right to self-determination.103 
Such analysis and any conclusions drawn should be based on the actual experiences of 
indigenous communities and reflect their perspectives.104  
Objections to the Inclusion of FPIC in the Declaration: A Right of Veto?  
The inclusion of the requirement for FPIC in the Declaration, given its potentially profound 
implications for control over and access to resources, was inevitably going to be contentious. 
As the requirement to obtain consent implies respecting the right to say ‘no’, one of the key 
contentious issues raised by certain states revolved around the notion of a ‘right to veto’. 
Objections to the inclusion of a requirement to obtain FPIC came primarily from the four 
countries that voted against the adoption of the Declaration, namely New Zealand, the 
United States, Australia and Canada. These same countries are home to most of the world’s 
transnational mining companies, many of which have operations or interests in indigenous 
territories either at home or abroad. The position of New Zealand, the United States and 
Australia with regard to FPIC is laid out in joint statements submitted to the PFII and the 
                                                          
103 F MacKay, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent and the World Bank’s 
Extractive Review’ (2004) 4 Sustainable Development Law and Policy 43-65. Forest Peoples 
Programme, an organisation focused on forest peoples’ rights, has published numerous reports on 
FPIC, including analyses of its implementation in a number of states. Numerous submissions were 
made to the World Commission on Dams regarding FPIC: see www.dams.org. 
104 The Tebtebba Foundation has conducted a number of such studies on the implementation of the 
FPIC in the Philippines (on file with the authors). The authors participated in consultation in relation 
to a number of FPIC processes conducted in the Philippines as part of the preparation of the 2009 
Philippines ICERD Indigenous Peoples Shadow Report see 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/cerds75.htm  
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Human Rights Council: ‘[I]t is our firm position that there can be no absolute right of free, 
prior, informed consent that is applicable uniquely to indigenous peoples and that would 
apply regardless of circumstances.’105 They further stated that giving a ‘veto’ to particular 
sub-groups of the population was not a position that a democratic government could 
accept.106 Canada also objected to the use of the concept of FPIC in the Declaration, which it 
argued could be interpreted as ‘giving a veto to indigenous peoples over many … 
development proposals … which concern the broader population and may affect indigenous 
peoples’.107 During the drafting process these states made unsuccessful attempts to weaken 
the requirement for FPIC by proposing that the operative verb ‘obtain’ be changed to ‘seek’, 
in relation to FPIC.  
A requirement to obtain indigenous peoples’ consent in relation to development projects in 
their territories is now firmly enshrined within the normative framework of indigenous 
peoples’ rights. At present however there appears to be some divergence of opinion within 
the human rights regime in relation to the situations which trigger this requirement.108 
                                                          
105 Statement of Peter Vaughn to the PFII, Representative of Australia, on behalf of Australia, New 
Zealand and the United States of America, on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, 22 May 2006, New 
Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. http://www.australiaun.org/unny/soc_220506.html 
106 Note verbale dated 2 August 2006 from the Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations 
Office at Geneva addressed to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
see UN Doc A/HRC/2/G/1 (24 August 2006).  
107 Canada’s position on the United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 29 
June 2006, http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ap/ia/pubs/ddr/ddr-eng.asp.  
108 On the one hand the requirements of Art 32 of the Declaration that FPIC be obtained for ‘any 
project’ and CERD’s General Comment XXIII requirement that ‘no decisions that impact on the rights 
and interests of indigenous peoples be taken without informed consent’ do not place any explicit 
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These opinions can be broadly grouped into two categories. The first is aligned with the view 
of many indigenous peoples and holds that FPIC is required for any project or activity 
affecting their lands, territories and resources or their well-being. The second, which also 
requires respect for FPIC, holds that it is only absolutely essential when there is a potential 
for a profound or major impact on the property rights of an indigenous people or where 
their physical or cultural survival may be endangered.109  
The first position is premised on the fact that consent is an integral part of the right to self-
determination. This implies that indigenous peoples have a right to determine if any projects 
that directly impact on them may or may not proceed. The outcomes envisaged are 
‘consent’, ‘no consent’ or ‘conditional consent’, where consent is given contingent on 
                                                                                                                                                                      
limitations on when FPIC should be sought. On the other hand the Inter-American Court in case of the 
Saramaka People v Suriname (n 43) and the Special Rapporteur on Fundamental Freedoms and 
Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples have suggested that where the basic well-being or physical or 
cultural survival of the community is not at risk or where a project does not have a ‘major impact’, 
consent may not be an absolute condition for pursuing the project. See Report of the Special 
Rapporteur Annex 1 (n 64). 
109 According to the Saramaka judgement ‘survival’ ‘must be understood as the ability of the 
[indigenous or tribal people] to “preserve, protect and guarantee the special relationship that [they] 
have with their territory”, so that “they may continue living their traditional way of life, and that their 
distinct cultural identity, social structure, economic system, customs, beliefs and traditions are 
respected, guaranteed and protected’ see Inter-American Court of Human Rights case of the 
Saramaka People v. Suriname Judgment of August 12, 2008 (Interpretation of the judgment on 
preliminary objections, merits, reparations, and costs) para 37.  
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certain binding conditions.110 In putting forward this argument, indigenous peoples have 
acknowledged that this exercise of their right to self-determination must be consistent with 
respect for the right to self-determination of others in the state.111  
FPIC, viewed from the legal perspective of indigenous peoples’ rights to self-determination 
and to permanent sovereignty over the natural resources located in their territories, could 
be seen as a compromise between two antagonistic international norms. It allows states to 
attempt to reconcile the apparently irreconcilable, namely indigenous peoples’ inherent 
right to natural resources under the principle of permanent sovereignty with states’ claims 
to sovereignty over these same resources under doctrines, such as the Regalian doctrine, 
which are upheld by most states where natural resource extraction occurs.112 This 
                                                          
110 See statement by Alberto Saldamando on behalf of the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC) 
under Agenda Item 3, Study on Indigenous People’s right to participate in decision-making to the 
EMRIP at its 3rd session July 2010 www.docip.org 
111 Statement by Mattias Ahren on behalf of the Arctic Council under Agenda Item 3, Study on 
Indigenous People’s right to participate in decision-making to the EMRIP 3rd session July 2010 
www.docip.org 
112 In common law jurisdictions ownership of surface generally implies ownership of subsoil resources. 
In most other jurisdictions ownership of subsoil resources is claimed by the state. For an analysis of 
the issue of the Regalian doctrine versus Ancestral Domains which include subsoil resources and the 
associated requirement to obtain FPIC in the Philippines, see AT Pagayatan and FJ Victoria (eds), A 
Divided Court, A Conquered People? Case Materials from the Constitutional Challenge to the 
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997 (Quezon City, Legal Rights and Natural Resources Centre Inc, 
Kasama sa Kalikasan LRC-KSK, Friends of the Earth-Philippines, 2001). For a related discussion, arguing 
that indigenous lands were always private property and never public lands, see M Leonen, ‘Weaving 
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perspective is closely aligned with the position of many indigenous peoples—that FPIC be 
required for ‘any’ projects that impact on their control over these resources. Also supporting 
this position is the fact that it would appear to be consistent with the ordinary meaning of 
the term ‘obtain consent’ used in the Declaration when considered in the context of its 
recognition of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination and its acknowledgement of 
historical injustices, ‘preventing them from exercising, in particular, their right to 
development in line with their needs and interests’.113  
The second position holds that the extent of the requirement to obtain consent is a function 
of the degree of impact of the proposed activity. Under this interpretation provisions of the 
Declaration are not absolute and therefore limitations can be placed on the exercise of 
indigenous peoples rights, including their rights to self-determination and FPIC. Any such 
restrictions to the enjoyment of rights must however satisfy a number of criteria.114 This 
approach envisages the consent requirement articulated in the Declaration as varying on a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Worldviews: Implications of Constitutional Challenges to the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997’ 
(2000) 10 Philippines Natural Resources Law Journal 3-44.  
113 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, preamble. Art 31 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (1969) requires that the ordinary meaning of the words in a treaty be interpreted ‘in 
their context and in light of its object and purpose’. This criterion could also be used for interpreting 
the provisions of the Declaration.  
114 Saramaka Interpretation (n 109) paras 34 & 35: notes that the Court under its jurisprudence Article 
21 requires that restrictions must be ’a) previously established by law; b) necessary; c) proportional, 
and d) with the aim of achieving a legitimate objective in a democratic society’ and in addition 
restrictions must not amount ‘to a denial of their traditions and customs in a way that endangers the 
very survival of the group and of its members’.  
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case by case basis,115 ranging from an ILO Convention 169 style ‘consultation with the 
objective of consent’ requirement for measures or projects with minor impacts, to a strict 
‘obligation to obtain consent’ for those with potentially major impacts or threatening the 
physical or cultural survival of a people. Under this interpretation of when FPIC is required it 
could be argued that, in the context of projects in their territories, the Declaration already 
identifies certain circumstances in which FPIC is always essential. Those explicitly mentioned 
are ‘the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources’,116 
‘relocation’,117 ‘disposal of any hazardous materials’,118 and the taking of ‘cultural, 
intellectual, religious and spiritual property’.119 This position could be used as a counter 
argument to the objections raised by New Zealand, Australia and the United States to FPIC 
on the grounds that it ‘would apply regardless of circumstances’.  
From an implementation perspective, basing the requirement to obtain FPIC on the possible 
impact of a project raises the question of who determines the potential impact on the well-
being of a community or its property rights. Indigenous peoples’ complaints in relation to 
natural resource extraction are generally targeted at states. Leaving the matter of 
determining the impact of these projects to the state, and consequently the decision as to 
whether FPIC is required or not, would therefore appear to change little in practice and is 
unlikely to be readily accepted by indigenous peoples. This view is reflected by the fact that 
                                                          
115 Saramaka interpretation (n 109) para 42 
116 Art 32. 
117 Art 10. 
118 Art 29. 
119 Art 11. 
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indigenous peoples are working at national, regional and international levels, in conjunction 
with the PFII, to develop their own framework of indicators for monitoring their well-
being.120 If the principles underlying the development of this framework are to be respected, 
then the logical conclusion is that indigenous peoples should be the ones to decide under 
which circumstances FPIC is required.  
Finally, the case for limiting or denying the requirement for FPIC is frequently based on the 
argument that indigenous peoples do not have an absolute right to ‘veto’ projects that are 
deemed to be in the public interest.121 However, it is important to bear in mind that in the 
context of extractive projects this public interest argument is strongly contested and is 
rarely, if ever, substantiated.122 Furthermore, international and regional human rights bodies 
                                                          
120 Indicators of Well-being, Poverty and Sustainability Relevant to Indigenous Peoples February 2008, 
UN Doc E/C.19/2008/9. For additional material on indicators relevant for Indigenous Peoples see 
http://www.tebtebba.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=53&Itemid=27 
121 This argument on behalf of some states and the extractive industry as a basis for denying a veto 
right can be traced back to discussions on the revision of ILO Convention 107 in 1986. See 
International Labour Conference, Partial Revision of the Indigenous and Tribal Populations 
Convention, No 107 (1957) Provisional Record 36, 75th session, 19.  
122 International empirical studies questioning the macro economic benefits of mining include JD 
Sachs and AM Warner, Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth (Cambridge, MA, Harvard 
Institute for International Development, 1997); JD Sachs and AM Warner, ‘The Curse of Natural 
Resources’ (2001) 45 European Economic Review 827–38; RM Auty, Resource Abundance and 
Economic Development: Improving the Performance of Resource-Rich Countries (United Nations 
University World Institute for Development and Economic Research, 1998); TM Power, Digging to 
Development: A Historical Look at Mining and Economic Development. An Oxfam America Report, 
September 2002. The concerns raised in these studies regarding the limited benefits accruing to 
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and national courts have cautioned states against infringement of indigenous peoples’ rights 
on the basis of national development and public interest.123 An interpretation of the 
Declaration that justifies derogations from the requirement to obtain FPIC on the basis of 
such arguments could therefore lead to a shift in the burden of proof away from the state 
and onto indigenous peoples in a manner that is incompatible with the spirit and intent of 
the Declaration.  
The Potential Impact of FPIC in the Declaration on Non-State Actors  
Along with states, the extractive industry, international financial institutions (IFIs) and 
investors have a major role to play in the realisation of FPIC in practice.124 The economic 
imperatives facing developing countries, in the context of a global development model that 
                                                                                                                                                                      
developing countries from resource extraction are exacerbated in many countries by generous tax 
incentives to entice foreign investment, high levels of corruption associated with the sector and the 
potential long-term impacts on other economic sectors such as agriculture, fisheries and tourism.  
123 HRC Lansman v Finland (n 58); CERD has held that the exploitation of resources for national 
development ‘must be exercised consistently with the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples’ 
Suriname CERD/C/64/CO/9/Rev.2, Para 15 (2004); the ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 
adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights on 25th June 1993, Part I, at para. 10. UN Doc. 
A/CONF.157/23, 12th July 1993 affirms that ‘development may not be invoked to justify the 
abridgement of internationally recognised human rights’; See also Canadian Supreme Court case R v 
Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.  
124 The NGO community and UN system also have an important role to play in the implementation of 
FPIC in their activities. The United Nations Development Group Guidelines on Indigenous Peoples 
issued in February 2008 to assist the UN system in mainstreaming indigenous peoples’ rights accords 
the principle of FPIC a central position. 
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promotes foreign direct investment (FDI) and bilateral investment agreements, can dictate 
the legislative protection these states afford to indigenous peoples vis-a-vis the interests of 
transnational corporations, including mining companies.125 In keeping with this prescription 
for development, some international bodies, states, investors and mining companies are 
arguing that the realisation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and poverty 
alleviation can be achieved through increased FDI in the extractive sector. This linking of the 
extractive industry and FDI to the MDGs should place an even greater onus on all involved to 
ensure adherence to the highest human rights standards, including the standards articulated 
in the Declaration. Failure to do so could result in an untenable position whereby the 
realisation of the MDGs, which should benefit indigenous peoples, becomes contingent on 
violations of their rights.126 
                                                          
125 Regarding impacts on legislation see E Caruso et al, ‘Synthesis Report’ in Extracting Promises: 
Indigenous Peoples, Extractive Industries & the World Bank (Baguio City, Tebtebba Indigenous Peoples 
International Centre for Policy Research and Education & Forest Peoples Programme, 2005). See also 
Tujan and Guzman (n 48). On agreements between host countries and companies see especially the 
Report of the Special Representative on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human 
Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/8/5 (2008) para 35. 
126 C Doyle, ‘Indigenous Peoples and the Millennium Development Goals: Sacrificial Lambs or Equal 
Beneficiaries?’ (2009) 13 International Journal of Human Rights 44. See also United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 2007, Transnational 
Corporations, Extractive Industries and Development, which focuses on FDI in the extractive sector 
and suggests that it may help with the realisation of the MDGs but fails to mention the requirement 
for FPIC when addressing impacts on or participation of indigenous peoples.  
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The World Bank Group has, to date, failed to include FPIC as a requirement in its policies 
pertaining to indigenous peoples, despite strong recommendations that it do so emerging 
from two major international reviews it had commissioned, one on dams and the other on 
the extractive industry.127 Instead the Bank has opted to include what it terms Free Prior 
Informed Consultation (FPICon) resulting in broad community support (BCS). The Bank’s own 
Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) has expressed concern in relation to the ‘ambiguity’ 
of the Bank’s ‘determination of BCS’.128 This insistence on FPICon rather than FPIC has been 
strongly criticised by non-governmental organisations, indigenous peoples and the Eminent 
Person responsible for the Extractive Industry Review.129 The implications of the adoption of 
                                                          
127 World Commission on Dams, www.dams.org, and ‘Striking a better balance Volume 1 The World 
Bank Group and Extractive Industries The Final Report of World Bank Extractive Industry Review’ 
December 2003 
http://irispublic.worldbank.org/85257559006C22E9/All+Documents/85257559006C22E985256FF600
6843AB/$File/volume1english.pdf. 
128 ‘IFC’s Policy and Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability and Disclosure 
Policy, Commentary on IFC’s Progress Report on the First 18 Months of Application’, Office of the 
Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) IFC and MIGA, World Bank Group, Advisory Note, 17 
December 2007. 
129 F MacKay, ‘The Draft World Bank Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples: Progress or More 
of the Same?’ (2005) 22 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 81. See also E Salim, 
‘Business as Usual with Marginal Change: EIR Final Comment on the WBG Management Response to 
the EIR’, Jakarta, 22 July 2004, in Extracting Promises (n 101) 340–50. Indigenous peoples and their 
support organizations have criticized BCS as being inconsistent with their right to self-determination 
see statement by Cathal Doyle on behalf of Indigenous Peoples Links (PIPLinks); the Forest Peoples 
Programme (FPP); the Asian Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP); the Foundation for Aboriginal and 
Islander Research Action (FAIRA); Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON); 
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the Declaration on the World Bank’s polices, however, remain to be seen. As a specialised 
agency of the United Nations it is coming under pressure to respect the rights and principles 
contained in the Declaration and to uphold its obligations under Article 41 to ‘contribute to 
the full realization of the Declaration’ and Article 42 to ‘promote respect for and full 
application of the provisions of this Declaration’.130 The Banks private sector arm, the 
International Financial Corporation (IFC) initiated a review of its performance standards in 
2009 and identified FPIC as one of four ‘key operation topics’.131 However, absence of any 
clear evidence to support its position, and despite repeated demands in consultations for 
the incorporation of FPIC into its performance standards, the IFC continues to hold that its 
current standard of FPICon is ‘functionally equivalent’ to FPIC.132 In doing so it refuses to 
accept its responsibility to respect international human rights law as it pertains to 
indigenous peoples and is increasingly isolated among other IFI’s.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
Organizacions de Naciones y Pueblos Indigenas en Argentina (ONPIA) and Middlesex University 
Department of Law under Agenda Item 4 to the 3rd session of the EMRIP 2010. www.docip.org 
130 Statement to EMRIP ibid. See also reports of consultations held in Manila, Washington DC and 
Brussels in 2010 and Turkey 2009 where demands were made that the IFC policy be updated to 
include FPIC, reports available at 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/policyreview.nsf/Content/Resources#P2Summaries 
131 ‘Progress Report on IFC’s Policy and Performance Standards on Social and Environmental 
Sustainability, and Policy on Disclosure of Information Review and Update Process’ International 
Finance Corporation (14 April 2010) paras 34 and 35 and Annex A ‘Review and Update of IFC’s 
Sustainability Framework: Overview of Key Issues’. 
132 ibid page 26 
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The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s (ERBD) Environmental and Social 
Policy, issued in May 2008, ‘recognises the principle, outlined in the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, that the prior informed consent of affected Indigenous 
Peoples is required for the project-related activities’. It requires clients who propose to 
develop natural resources commercially in indigenous peoples’ lands to ‘enter into good 
faith negotiation with the affected communities of Indigenous Peoples, and document their 
informed participation and consent as a result of the negotiation’.133 The Asian Development 
Bank safeguard policy issued in July 2009 includes a requirement to obtain FPIC.134 However, 
the ADB policy includes a definition of consent as ‘broad community support’ which is 
incompatible with the requirement that it be obtained in a manner that respects indigenous 
customs and traditions. The policy also places limitation on when the requirement for 
consent applies.135 The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) adopted its current policy 
on indigenous peoples prior to the adoption of the Declaration in 2006. It mirrors ILO 
                                                          
133 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Environmental and Social Policy, 
issued May 2008, page 50, http://www.ebrd.com/pages/about/principles/sustainability/policy.shtml. 
There appears to be some ambiguity in the EBRD definition of consent with a footnote in the policy 
linking it to involvement in, rather than authorisation of, a project. It states: ‘Consent refers to the 
process whereby the affected community of Indigenous Peoples arrive at a decision, in accordance 
with their cultural traditions, customs and practices as to whether to become involved in the 
proposed project.’  
134 Asian Development Bank, Safeguard Policy Statement July 2009 
135  ibid para 33. The policy restricts the requirement for FPIC to projects involving ‘commercial 
development of natural resources within customary lands under use that would impact the 
livelihoods or on cultural, ceremonial, or spiritual uses of the lands that define the identity and 
community of Indigenous Peoples’. 
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Convention 169’s requirement that consultation must have the objective of achieving 
agreement or consent.136 In line with the IFC reasoning the IDB states that, while it has not 
included FPIC in its policy, ‘it has included the equivalent—good faith negotiation—for 
special cases (proactive projects and projects with significant impact)’.137 This statement 
would appear to imply that the IDB acknowledges that good faith negotiations include the 
right of indigenous communities to say ‘no’ to such projects. Importantly following the 
IACHR’s Saramaka v Suriname ruling, FPIC is effectively required under the IDB policy, which 
identifies ‘applicable legal norms’ as including ‘international jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights’.138 In addition to banks, investors also play a significant 
role in funding extractive projects. Increasing demand from customers for ethical investment 
options has resulted in some investors advocating for respect of indigenous peoples rights 
and making attempts to encourage extractive companies to obtain FPIC.139 However such 
                                                          
136 Inter-American Development Bank Operational Policy on Indigenous People (OP-765) and Strategy 
for Indigenous Development (GN -2387-5), July 2006. 
137 UN Doc E/C.19/2008/4/Add.10, Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Information Received 
from the United Nations System and other Intergovernmental Organizations, Inter-American 
Development Bank, 7 February 2008.  
138 Inter-American Development Bank Operational Policy (n 137), page 19.  
139 Ethical Funds Company, ‘Sustainability Perspectives Winning the Social License to Operate 
Resource Extraction with Free, Prior, and Informed Community Consent’, February 2008, 
https://www.ethicalfunds.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/docs/FPIC.pdf see also ‘Improving Vedanta 
Resources’ governance of responsible business practices’ Experts in Responsible Investment Solutions 
(EIRIS) July 2010 and Robert Kropp ‘Investors Urge US to Support Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ 
Sustainability Investment News July 30, 2010 
http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi?sfArticleId=3003 
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initiatives are rare, with most policies in this sector driven, at best, by the standards 
produced by and for extractive industry bodies themselves.  
The International Council for Minerals and Metals (ICMM) is the body that represents many 
of the major companies in the global mining industry. Despite making promises in 
discussions with indigenous peoples to include FPIC in its standards, it failed to do so.140 
Instead it only recommends that companies ‘seek broad community support’ for their 
projects, a position which is even weaker than that of the World Bank. The ICMM argues 
that ‘practical implementation of FPIC presents significant challenges for government 
authorities as well as affected companies as the concept is not well defined and with very 
few exceptions, is not enshrined in local legislation’141 However, the fact that FPIC is 
enshrined in legislation in a number of countries, in some cases for over a decade, and an 
increasing number of voluntary agreements pertaining to its implementation exist in other 
sectors, belies this claim.142 The ICMM argument also ignores the fact that pressure exerted 
                                                          
140 ICMM Position Statement, Mining and Indigenous Peoples, released May 2008. The statement did 
not recognise the requirement to obtain FPIC but did commit ICMM members to participating ‘in 
national and international forums on indigenous peoples’ issues, including those dealing with the 
concept of free, prior and informed consent. See www.icmm.com. See also Moody (n 48) 10–11.  
141 Forest Peoples Programme and Association of Saramaka Authorities, Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent: Two Cases from Suriname (FPIC Working Papers, Forest Peoples Programme, Moreton-in-
Marsh, March 2007) 16, www.forestpeoples.org/documents/law_hr/fpic_suriname_mar07_eng.pdf. 
See also Mining and Indigenous Peoples Issues Roundtable: Continuing a Dialogue between 
Indigenous Peoples and Mining Companies. IUCN-ICMM Dialogue on Mining and Biodiversity Sydney, 
Australia’ 30-31 January 2008 Page 7 
142 See generally Forest Peoples Programme, Free, Prior and Informed Consent and the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil: A Guide for Companies (Forest Peoples Programme, Moreton-in-Marsh, October 
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by the mining industry on governments in developing countries contributes to their 
reluctance to enact legislation pertaining to the implementation of FPIC in the first place.143 
Furthermore, it is ethically, and arguably legally, questionable not to uphold a principle of 
international human rights law on the ground that it has not yet been enshrined in local 
legislation.144 It is to be hoped that the adoption of the Declaration and associated 
developments in international human rights law will eventually result in a revision of the 
ICMM’s and its member’s positions vis-a-vis FPIC. Doing so would arguably be in the 
industry’s own long-term interest.145  
                                                                                                                                                                      
2008). See also M Colchester and M Farhan Ferrari, Making FPIC Work: Challenges and Prospects for 
Indigenous People (Forest Peoples Programme, June 2007), providing an overview of experiences of 
FPIC in Suriname, Guyana, Peru, Peninsular Malaysia, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and the 
Philippines.  
143 For example in Australia pressure excreted by the mining industry resulted in the weakening of the 
consent requirement in the 1976 Northern Territories Land Rights Act see 
http://www.nlc.org.au/html/land_act_changes.html.  
144 The International Financial Institution (IFC) notes in its advice to companies on complying with ILO 
Convention 169 states that: ‘There may also be circumstances where private sector companies’ 
actions could influence or compromise the State’s implementation of its obligations under 
international agreements, such as Convention 169’. See ‘ILO Convention 169 and the Private Sector: 
Questions and Answers for IFC Clients’, IFC World Bank Group, March 2007. 
145 Even ignoring the legal and moral obligations incumbent on companies to respect indigenous 
peoples’ rights, strong arguments can be made as to why respecting the principle of FPIC may be 
beneficial to the industry in relation to its reputation and its capacity to ensure meaningful 
community engagement and maximise the prospect of long-term project viability. For an example of 
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The Future of FPIC and its Implications for the Declaration’s 
Implementation  
Overall, when considering the potential future impact of the requirement to obtain FPIC in 
the Declaration it is important not to lose sight of its historical and contemporary context. 
Historical pacts between indigenous peoples themselves, and subsequently between 
indigenous peoples and states, show that consent has long been a basic principle in 
agreements involving indigenous peoples. Unfortunately, history also shows that where such 
agreements existed states have failed to respect them, invariably to the detriment of 
indigenous peoples. The re-emergence of the requirement to obtain indigenous peoples’ 
consent over recent decades is undeniable. It can be traced from the relatively limited 
requirement under ILO Convention 169 to obtain consent in relation to relocation, through 
to CERD’s 1997 interpretation of ICERD in its General Comment XXIII as requiring states 
parties to obtain indigenous peoples’ informed consent in relation to all ‘decisions that 
directly impact on their rights and interests’, and up to the FPIC obligations articulated in the 
Declaration in light of its recognition of indigenous peoples right to self-determination. 
These provisions of the Declaration requiring FPIC are now informing international law, as 
evidenced by decisions of the HRC, the IACHR, the ACHPR and national Courts, the analysis 
of Special Rapporteurs, and the growing number of cases involving failure to obtain FPIC that 
are being considered by CERD under its Early Warning Urgent Action procedure. 
In state practice, there currently exist varying degrees of recognition of FPIC, ranging from 
states that deny any requirement for FPIC to states that have enshrined it in legislation or 
have considered affording it constitutional protection. Even within the human rights regime, 
while there is clear acknowledgement of the necessity of FPIC to ensure the well-being of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
such an argument see World Resource Institute, Development without Conflict: The Business Case for 
Community Consent, May 2007, pdf.wri.org/development_without_conflict_fpic.pdf. 
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indigenous peoples, there exists some divergence of opinion as to when it should be 
mandatory. While these divergent opinions and practices might look like inconsistencies 
within the human rights regime, they may be more appropriately seen as reflective of an 
evolution along the spectrum of participative rights towards a consensus on a principle of, or 
right to, FPIC that effectively protects the well-being of indigenous communities in a manner 
that is consistent with their right to self-determination.146 This evolution involves a shift in 
the established balance of power and will, as a result, occur at different rates in differing 
contexts. Nevertheless, despite any apparent inconsistencies, a clear trend is emerging 
within the international human rights regime toward recognition of the requirement for FPIC 
in line with what has been agreed upon with the adoption of the Declaration.  
Finally, while FPIC is often referred to as a principle, it might more appropriately be 
conceived of as a right. Many, if not most, indigenous peoples hold this view.147 They see 
FPIC as an inherent right of indigenous peoples, without which the rights to self-
determination, lands, territories, resources and development can be rendered effectively 
meaningless. Denial of FPIC implies that control over decisions pertaining to their lands and 
resources, and by extension over their futures, is taken from them. Consultation with 
indigenous peoples is essential. However, consultations and negotiations without a 
requirement for consent freezes existing power relations and leaves indigenous peoples 
                                                          
146 B Clavero, ‘The Indigenous Rights of Participation and International Development Policies’ (2005) 
22 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 41 suggests that the existing spectrum of 
consent related obligations, ranging from mere consultation to veto rights, indicate that international 
law is in a ‘transitional phase’ with regard to indigenous peoples’ participation. 
147 Repeated statements referring to a right to FPIC have been made by indigenous communities at 
the PFII, the former WGIP, and the Experts Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
www.docip.org. See also WGIP Standard-Setting Legal Commentary (n 52). 
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with no leverage to influence the outcome of decision-making processes. States, global 
financial institutions and transnational extractive corporations currently hold this decision-
making power and are clearly reluctant to share it with indigenous peoples. In this sense, 
indigenous peoples’ struggle for what they regard as their right to FPIC is perhaps best 
conceived in terms of Shivji’s conceptualisation of human rights when he argues that: 
seen as a means of struggle, ‘right’ is therefore not a standard granted as charity from above 
but a standard-bearer around which people rally for struggle from below. By the same token 
the correlate of ‘right’ is … power/privilege where those who enjoy such power/privilege are 
the subject of being exposed and struggled against.148  
FPIC seen in this light is a powerful tool in indigenous peoples’ struggle to alter longstanding 
discriminatory power equations. To ensure its effective implementation indigenous peoples 
will have to continue to rally and demand respect for this right to FPIC in all fora available to 
them. The adoption of the Declaration is a reflection of the adeptness of indigenous peoples 
in terms of getting their rights recognised. The extent to which FPIC is implemented in 
practice will be a measure of how successful they are in ensuring that they are upheld. 
Conclusion 
Some states have in the past maintained that the Declaration is only ‘aspirational ... with 
political and moral force but not legal force’.149 However, this limited conception of the 
Declaration fails to appreciate its true significance. A more appropriate and realistic 
conception of the Declaration holds that it is an integral part of the evolving normative 
                                                          
148 IG Shivji, The Concept of Human Rights in Africa (London, Council for the Development of Economic 
and Social Research in Africa, 1989) 71. 
149 Statement by Mr Hill on behalf of Australia. Report of the General Assembly 61st session UN Doc 
A/61/PV.107 (2007) page 12 
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framework of indigenous peoples’ rights. The Declaration is in fact reflective of, and 
contributes to, the evolution of this normative framework pertaining to the recognition of 
indigenous rights. It attempts to address the fragmentation of the existing human rights 
regime by consolidating the rights this regime has recognised as pertaining to indigenous 
peoples into a single framework specific to them. However, it does not purport to be all-
encompassing. Rather, acknowledging its place within the normative human rights 
framework, it provides space for evolution which may impact on those rights. The 
Declaration also lays out a roadmap for the future realisation of indigenous peoples’ rights. 
It does so by providing a comprehensive, yet flexible, rights-based framework for the 
engagement of states, corporations, developmental and UN agencies with indigenous 
peoples. This framework is premised on the principles of self-determination, FPIC and the 
recognition of indigenous peoples’ collective rights to their land, territories and resources. 
While unambiguous in its requirement of adherence to these principles as the basis and 
minimum standard for engagement with indigenous peoples, the Declaration avoids being 
overly prescriptive as to the mechanics of how this engagement should occur in specific 
contexts. An example of this is the Declaration’s instruction to states to establish and 
implement processes, in conjunction with, and ensuring the participation of, indigenous 
peoples, to adjudicate indigenous peoples’ rights pertaining to their lands, territories and 
resources while ensuring that due respect and consideration is given to their customs, 
traditions, laws and land tenure systems. This need for the recognition of indigenous 
peoples’ customs and land tenure systems identified in the Declaration is in line with recent 
developments within the international human rights regime calling for the recognition of 
indigenous peoples’ customary laws as sources of law and for greater recognition of the 
cultural rights of indigenous peoples, including the maintenance of their traditional 
customary land tenure systems. 
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Following its adoption the human rights regime has proceeded to acknowledge the 
importance of the Declaration as a component of the normative framework of indigenous 
peoples’ rights. Recent decisions emerging from national and regional courts citing the 
Declaration and its provisions on, inter alia, land rights and FPIC bear testimony to its pivotal 
and evolving role within this normative framework. Complementary developments within 
the international human rights regime such as CERD’s increased emphasis on the rights and 
principles articulated in the Declaration, particularly FPIC, should assist indigenous peoples 
in their effort to ensure that the rights articulated in the Declaration are realised in practice, 
and states in understanding their obligation to facilitate this. 
In terms of land, territory and resource rights, the Declaration is consistent with the existing 
body of international law and is sufficiently precise to give rise to identifiable and practicable 
rights and obligations and attract broad international support. Overall, within the current 
framework of international law regarding indigenous peoples’ rights to lands, territories and 
resources, the Declaration has to be seen and accepted as a threshold reflecting the 
minimum standard of international law in this area. Over six decades have passed since the 
adoption of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Given the unprecedented influence 
this document has had on legal systems throughout the world it is worth highlighting that a 
declaration is a call to adopt universal accepted minimum standards of protection on which 
a system can then be developed. This is how international human rights law has evolved, 
and it is how indigenous peoples’ rights will evolve. Hence, the affirmation of rights to lands, 
territories and resources in the Declaration does not represent the end, but rather the 
beginning, of a process of implementation. Operationalising FPIC and establishing 
adjudication mechanisms that respect indigenous peoples’ customary laws and land tenure 
systems are tangible examples of how this implementation process must proceed.  
 62
The Declaration therefore sets the minimum threshold on which the future system of 
protection at the international, regional, national and local levels ought to be based. Viewed 
from the past and looking towards the future, the real revolution behind the Declaration is 
arguably the affirmation by states that they are not the only entities entitled to title to 
territory; that they do have to recognise and uphold the inherent rights of indigenous 
peoples which preceded the creation of the state. Consequently, control over lands, 
territories and resources does not lie exclusively with the government of a country; 
indigenous peoples have fundamental rights to ownership, use and control over their lands, 
territory and resources. 
